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Green budgeting in an age of austerity: a transatlantic comparative perspective

Abstract
This paper investigates the integration of environmental concerns into government fiscal cycles, or green budgeting. Despite being an increasingly popular means of pursuing environmental policy, the global spread of green budgeting governance norms has been manifestly uneven. However, recent stimulus packages employed by many advanced economies to promote economic growth have had a strong green element. This raises questions over how the current desire for fiscal austerity interacts with existing factors that constrain or facilitate environmental policy via budgeting. By drawing on theoretical arguments that argue macro ‘politics matters’ in budget composition, we develop an analytical framework for explaining budgeting practices. This political preference framework (PPF) is then employed to examine green budgeting in two leading but otherwise contrasting industrialised economies, namely the USA and the UK. From this analysis, it is argued that key veto players have often set the green budgeting agenda in the current age of austerity. The scope for further theoretical, empirical and normative research is consequently discussed.
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Introduction
The global financial crisis has resulted in ballooning public debt in many advanced economies, leading to pressure on public spending. Critiques of this new age of austerity have mostly focused on reasons why this crisis occurred (Mizen 2008; Brunnermeier 2009) or the impacts of subsequent government budgetary responses on public services (Wilks 2010). Yet in response to sluggish growth, governments worldwide have explicitly singled out environmental programmes as a spending priority (UNEP 2009) despite pressures for budgetary constraint. For some governments, the current age of austerity has, superficially at least, stimulated integration of the environment into budgets (Luke 2009); a phenomenon that we seek to explore empirically and explain theoretically.

Green budgeting, or the integration of environmental concerns into government fiscal cycles (Wilkinson et al. 2008), is hardly new. For decades, Governments have sought to steer environmental policy objectives via fiscal instruments such as taxes and subsidies. Critical contemporary drivers include shifts towards softer modes of governance over more traditional regulation (for example, Jordan et al. 2011) as well as promoting green budgeting norms through international initiatives such as the United Nations Agenda 21, Global Green New Deal and Green Economy measures (see UNEP 2009). The rationale behind this approach is that future economic prosperity depends on green technological growth. These efforts also chime with the concept of ecological modernisation, whereby win-win approaches to economic growth and environmental sustainability are envisaged (e.g. Barry and Paterson 2004; Hertin and Berkhout 2003). For example, subsidies for domestic green energy production are promoted on the back of creating jobs and decarbonisation. Critics of ecological modernisation have argued that this positive-sum framing is unrealistic as continuous economic growth on a planet with finite resources inevitably leads to environmental degradation (see Daley 2007; Bina and La Camera 2011); an issue we return to later. 

Existing literature on green budgeting suggests that its impacts, even in front-running countries like the UK, Sweden and Germany (see Jordan and Lenschow 2008) are questionable. Thus important questions arise over the political drivers of, and barriers to, green budgeting. For example, given the historically low prominence of green budgeting, why have we seen an explicit emphasis placed on green fiscal measures during the current economic downturn? In other words, what factors are determining green budgeting in the age of austerity? In addition, how can we theoretically explain these events? When addressing such questions we argue that budget allocation and the politics behind it provide some macro-level indication of political and policy preferences (e.g. Hicks and Swank 1992; Bräuninger 2005). As we later explain, little consideration is given to how macro-level political processes influence spending on environmental measures within national budget composition despite the growing significance of green budgeting. This evident gap at the interface between budget composition and environmental policy literatures therefore warrants further attention. 

In addressing these questions we do not directly examine the ‘green’ claims of fiscal stimulus measures, the extent to which budget composition results in improved or diminished outputs (i.e. policies), or outcomes (i.e. the state of the environment) in relation to the environment. Indeed, associating a single process like budgeting to an output or outcome is inherently difficult because of the different variables involved (see Jordan and Lenschow 2008). Moreover, in examining green budgeting, we recognise that budgetary processes encompass more than composition and allocation of funding (see Benson et al. 2008) but addressing full budgetary cycles would be beyond the scope of one paper. We therefore do not focus on eco-taxation, which has been covered extensively elsewhere (e.g. Ekins and Speck 2011). Instead, this paper primarily examines how macro-level political processes shaped the environmental component of budget compositions in response to the 2008 financial crisis. 

Our analysis is structured as follows. Firstly, we interrogate the literature on budgeting to identify key arguments, including the notion that macro-level ‘politics matters’ when understanding budgetary ‘composition’ (Section 2). This review is then employed to develop our theoretical framework (Section 3). Here we focus on explaining green budgeting processes through established theories of political preference. Section 4 then presents evidence of contemporary green budgeting from the USA and the UK. Both countries offer contrasting systems of government through which to examine whether common patterns can be seen regardless of administrative structure. Power in the UK rests primarily with the executive branch of government compared to the US ‘checks and balances’ approach where power is distributed between the Presidency and legislature. Moreover, these cases remain significant since they have adopted divergent responses to the economic crisis, while (in rhetoric at least) singling out the environment for special consideration (e.g. the USA allocated 12% of its initial fiscal stimulus to green programmes and the UK 17% (UNEP 2009)). While the USA sought to restore domestic economic confidence via a significant stimulus package, the UK initially followed this path only to later cut public expenditure. These trends are theoretically analysed to account for green budgeting practice. Finally, we explore future directions for researching green budgeting.

Budgeting processes and the composition of budgets

The past four decades have witnessed a burgeoning literature on budgets, although a major distinction is evident in the dependent variable, i.e. process, performance and sectoral composition. To date, much research has focused on non-compositional elements of the budgeting process, with early studies primarily concerned with positing normative prescriptions. Aaron Wildavsky (1964) made a major contribution by adopting a more analytical approach. Theoretical arguments were subsequently developed on how budget proponents ‘muddle through’ via incrementalism. More recently, studies on incremental ‘bounded rationality-inspired’ budgetary change has given way to considering punctuated equilibrium theory (Bruenig and Koski 2006: 363; Baumgartner et al. 2007). Other accounts adopt game theoretical approaches, characterised by interactions between utility maximising spending ministries seeking to enhance budget outcomes and institutions striving to control public expenditure (e.g. Niskanen (1994) and Downs (1967)).  

A parallel debate emerged in the 1990s and early 2000s within the political economy literature concerned with explaining budget performance, primarily outcomes such as deficits. A veritable sub-literature emerged to analyse contributing factors. For example, institutions and rule based decision-making are the focus of von Hagen’s research into fiscal performance (von Hagen 2002; Hallerberg et al. 2007). Meanwhile, Alesina (2000) employs a ‘tax smoothing’ hypothesis to normatively determine US government policy when faced with budgetary surplus. While this debate has somewhat subsided, political economy arguments have (rather asymmetrically) tended to dominate academic discussion on budgeting performance. 

Research on budget composition is nonetheless evident, particularly in relation to welfare expenditure, focusing on how politics influence the budgetary ‘status quo’. Here, significant changes in budget composition are held dependent on strategic macro-level political imperatives rather than meso-level negotiations between spending ministries and budget allocating agencies. Hicks and Swank (1992: 658) note that a debate emerged between authors in the 1970s over ‘how politics matters for welfare spending in industrialised democracies’. They consequently gauge its extent through quantitative multi-national comparative research to determine how ‘government partisanship, the self-interests of government personnel, mass electoral preferences, or neocorporatist institutions’ (ibid.) impact on welfare budget allocations. Electoral turnout, political ideology and the strength of governing actors vis-à-vis opposition parties are considered statistically significant. Political partisanship is a factor identified by Bräuninger (2005) in determining budget size and composition across 19 OECD states. Similarly, Bawn (1999) reflects on the influence of federal government ideology on budget compositions in Germany. Tsebelis and Chang (2004) meanwhile explore how veto players influence budget structures to argue that ideological factors are significant (see also Koenig and Troeger 2005).





Theorising green budgeting: a political preference framework

Macro-level political preferences are therefore significant in explaining sectoral outcomes. Although primarily focused on welfare provision, these arguments can potentially be extended to encompass the environmental sector. Indeed the dedicated environmental foci of fiscal stimulus measures seem to challenge previous attempts at green budgeting, suggesting a strategic macro-level change in political preferences. For our analysis, we therefore develop three main theoretical models from the existing literature to examine how macro-level political preferences shape budgetary compositions, namely: partisanship, ideology and public preferences.

Partisanship: the partisan politics model
Hicks and Swank (1992: 668) identify partisanship as potentially significant in welfare spending. Their findings suggest that party characteristics shape expenditure patterns with ‘center-led’ governments favouring welfare allocations, although ‘left party effects’ are also prominent (ibid.). Explaining this phenomenon the authors cite centrist administration needs to pursue income redistribution, and the disproportionate impacts of left-leaning parties on their policy decisions as opposed to right wing opposition groups. These results appear to support a partisan politics model which identifies differences in expenditure preferences between left and ring wing parties; the former favouring more social programmes the latter emphasising economic concerns and fiscal restraint (Hibbs 1977; Bräuninger 2005). These findings however appear unsupported by Bawn (1999) in analysing German federal government budgeting. Centre left coalition governments endorsed the budgetary status quo rather than high spending agendas. Evidence on partisan factors in government expenditure is therefore ‘mixed’ (Bräuninger 2005: 409). In overcoming this dichotomy, Bräuninger (2005: 410) forwards a partisan model, arguing that actors’ preferences diverge for the ‘level’ and ‘distribution’ of expenditure meaning they:
‘differ in... the weight they put on “government efficiency” or small budgets as well as the electoral salience of spending for different policy areas’
The author hypothesises that budget size is dependent on the potential for ‘fiscal policy change’, while budget composition too reflects a political preference for allocation (ibid.). 

When applied to green budgeting, the model allows two predictions. Firstly, that government party political alignment influences allocations of fiscal resources to the environmental sector, although (drawing on Bawn and others) this may not reflect a left-right binary relationship. For example, UK main parties express fairly strong environmental policy agendas. Thus, rather than ideological identity merely concerning whether to intervene or not, it may manifest in budget composition through the selection of remedies (Bräuninger 2005:423). For instance, policy instrument selection (market-based mechanisms vs. regulation?) or support for certain technologies (nuclear vs. renewables?). Secondly, and in relation to the first point, how money is allocated to environmental programmes may also reflect partisan preferences. Stronger distributional elements to green budgeting may correlate with the ‘programmatic preferences’ of centre-left governments (ibid.). While budgetary initiatives aimed at insulating homes for low-income households satisfy these preferences, others aimed at supporting renewables through building markets may conversely reflect right wing priorities. 

Ideology: the veto players model
Tsebelis and Chang (2004) forward a theory of budget composition based on examining veto player preferences in multidimensional political arenas. Veto players are understood as ‘individuals or institutions whose agreement is required for a change of the status quo’ (ibid.). Their central proposition is that ‘when the number of veto players and their ideological distances increase, policy stability also increases’ with only limited shifts from the ‘status quo’ evident (ibid.: 449). This hypothesis is tested across changes in budget structures in 19 OECD states to show that ideological distance can explain compositional change but that ‘alternation’ in ideological characteristics between incumbent and previous governments may also prove significant (ibid.). 

Two types of veto arrangement are evident: institutional and partisan. Institutional veto players are formally able to veto budgets through constitutional provision. This becomes evident in the USA where the separation of powers between the President and the Congress means that each can veto the other. Partisan vetos relate to coalition governments, with each coalition party having different constituencies and potentially different policy preferences. As gaps increase between coalition partners on budgetary issues, veto becomes more likely. 

In green budgeting, drawing on Tsebelis and Chang (2004) we might argue that increasing ideological ‘distance’ between key veto players could make structural change to address non-core ‘items’ such as environmental issues more problematic. According to these authors, coalitions seek increased budgetary stability over time which could favour traditional core expenditure such as social welfare, defence and health at the expense of more politically expedient areas such as the environment. However, ideological ‘alternation’ (ibid.) through government change may also influence its political prominence both positively and negatively.

Public choice: the electoral preference model

Reflecting on factors shaping welfare expenditure, Hicks and Swank (1992) argue that electoral issues are significant. While party electoral competition over budget composition ‘does not seem to matter for welfare effort’ (ibid.: 668) suggesting spending pledges made are often modified (or even ignored) by parties when assuming office, high degrees of electoral turnout are deemed positive for welfare spending. Although little interpretation is offered by the authors, it is suggested that high electoral turnout favours more socially positive policies such as welfare as large numbers of working class voters demand expenditure on these items by incoming administrations. Moreover, public choice arguments infer that once ensconced in office, governments respond to ongoing demands from electorates for action for fear of future de-selection. These arguments in part chime with debates on environmental citizenship and democracy examining whether augmented democratic involvement of citizens in environmental management enhances behaviours and preferences for positive action (e.g. Dobson and Valencia Sáiz 2005; Hajer and Kesselring 1999; Smith 2001).

In this model, green budget development would reflect more public rather than political actor preferences. Certain ‘valence issues’ or ‘taken for granted’ issues on which there is ‘a high degree of homogeneity of opinion’ like the economy (Lindblom 1979: 533) tend to be automatically selected for consideration by politicians running for election or constructing budgets. This can leave environmental concerns subject to the vagaries of public opinion. As noted by Downs (1972), environment is politically ephemeral; a position issue cycling through the public, and hence political, consciousness according to the prominence of environmental crises. Demands for budgeting change would then go ‘up and down with ecology’ (ibid.), i.e. dependent on issue salience. Initial concerns for environmental issues may be displaced by pressing economic and employment priorities. Promises of green growth and budgeting therefore remain unfulfilled by politicians concerned about their costs and seeking short term economic goals in tune with electoral cycles. 

Our political preference framework (PPF) for green budgeting consequently includes several characteristics (Table 1). Firstly, the different key actors highlighted by each theory. Secondly, the theoretical rationales for the development, or non-development, of green budgeting. 
Table 1: an analytical-theoretical framework for explaining green budgeting.
Theory	Key actors	Green budgeting rationales
Partisan politics	Political parties	Party political preferences
Veto players	Veto actors	Ideological distanceIdeological alternation




The ‘power of the purse’: green budgeting in an age of austerity

The politics of US green budgeting 
Federal budgeting has a long history in the USA. As Schick (2000: 10) shows, the US Constitution originally gave Congress ‘the power of the purse’ by obliging the President and federal agencies to gain its consent for their spending. Congress exercised this power through controlling ‘appropriations’ or items of agency expenditure (ibid.). This system endured into the early 20th Century when in 1921, faced with mounting public debt, Congress voted for increased Presidential budgetary control. The President was compelled to submit an annual budget to Congress with federal agencies required to make expenditure requests to the President. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) was introduced to advise the President on budget preparation and oversee implementation. Today, this system of divided institutional powers still underpins the federal budgeting system. 

The federal budgeting cycle follows a set procedure. The Office of Management and Budget asks federal agencies to submit funding requests which are integrated into the President’s budget preparation. Next, the President submits the budget to Congress, detailing the administration’s spending and revenue raising plans. Subsequent Congressional scrutiny occurs by budget committees of direct spending (i.e. that mandated by law) in order to formulate a concurrent resolution, agreed between both houses. The resolution establishes revenue, spending and other priorities. Discretionary spending (i.e. ‘appropriations’ for non-mandatory spending) is considered in separate appropriation bills. If passed by both houses, these budgetary measures are signed into law. Once agreed, the budget is implemented by federal agencies under OMB supervision. Interaction between institutions ensures that a broad if not always peaceful consensus is reached in the budgetary process. So while the President initiates and develops the budget programme, Congress is a constitutional ‘veto player’ with the power to block budgets or suggest amendments. 


History of green budgeting – 1940-2009
The federal government has sought to steer environmental objectives via fiscal measures for decades, although commitments have mirrored political context. Budget data on annual federal government environmental expenditures dates back to 1940 (USGPO 2011). Federal ‘outlays’ on ‘natural resources and environment’ at this point totaled $997 million (ibid.). Spending remained relatively low until the late 1950s, beyond which federal expenditure grew steadily. By 1969, outlays stood at $2900 million – three times the 1940 figure (ibid.). Green budgeting expanded significantly in the 1970s with the introduction of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and federal environmental legislation such as the Clean Water Act amendments. The latter often entailed large grants to states to support implementation. Outlays reached $7346 million in 1975 and $13858 million in 1980. Thereafter the Republican Reagan administration drastically cut federal funding on environmental initiatives, including EPA budgets (see Andrews 2006). Expenditures fell for most of the decade and only grew again after George Bush Senior assumed office. Despite a change to a Democrat Presidency in 1993, expenditures tailed off and at times fell during the following Clinton administration (Washington Post 2011). Here, the overriding Republican desire within Congress to reduce the budget deficit meant that many federal programmes saw reduced financial support.  

Environmental concerns were generally more prominent in federal budgeting under George Bush Jnr, with spending averaging over 40% above 1982 levels (Washington Post 2011). That said, environmental expenditures grew only slowly after 2002 and actually declined towards the end of his tenure (ibid.). Moreover, the administration favoured support for priorities such as clean water. Some limited federal measures were introduced to address climate change but the administration’s quiescence towards this issue is well recorded (Byrne et al. 2007). For the most part, the Bush federal budget reflected US overseas military action with massive defense spending contributing to a mounting deficit. By early 2008, as the credit crunch unfolded, the government was forced to intervene. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) and Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) were hastily introduced to shore up failing financial institutions – but with limited effects on the wider economy.
The age of austerity?
In 2008, Democrat Barack Obama ran a charismatic Presidential election campaign, citing the need to move the US away from the disastrous economic policies of his Republican predecessor. His campaign pledges included introducing various environmental initiatives, such as a new national low carbon fuel standard, increasing fuel economy standards, promoting hybrid fuel cars, ensuring greater renewable energy generation, and developing clean coal technology. Perhaps the most significant pledge was to cut US greenhouse gas emissions through a national cap and trade scheme (or emissions trading) and restore US international leadership in climate change negotiations. 

Once elected President, Obama responded to a worsening economy by signing the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in February 2009. Also known as the Stimulus Act, the legislation provided $787 billion dollars to generate jobs and stimulate economic recovery. Evoking the tradition of Roosevelt’s New Deal of the 1930s, the stimulus was the largest single spending initiative in US peacetime history. Although the bill was quickly passed by Congress, there was little Republican support demonstrating strong conservative hostility towards a federal bail-out. One reason was the growing public deficit; a continuing source of political contestation for many Republicans.

Box 1. Main green components of 2009 fiscal stimulus (ARRA)$18 billion on environmental protection (water, sewage treatment, land management)$8 billion for rail projects$27 billion for energy efficiency and renewables

Prospects for federal green budgeting were initially positive under the new administration. Major environmentally related expenditures in the form of loans and investments were contained in ARRA (see Box 1). Furthermore, additional funding was provided for radioactive waste cleanup, improving energy efficiency, building smart electricity grids, tax credits for home energy efficiency and promoting renewable energy generation. Environmental funding also increased under Obama’s first federal budget in 2009 (USGPO 2010). In 2010, Obama then requested a 34% expansion in EPA funding from $7.8 billion to $10.5 billion, anticipating that the cap and trade scheme would provide an additional $150 billion for clean energy and allow the EPA to establish a national greenhouse gas emissions inventory (ibid.).

But by this point, the cap and trade policy was in trouble. An emissions trading bill narrowly survived a contentious House of Representatives vote in 2009 after strong Republican opposition (New York Times 2009). A Senate bill was then introduced but its passage stalled as it failed to gain cross-party support from senators. Negotiations continued into 2010 but subsequently were delayed ahead of Congressional election campaigning in November. Despite their mauling at the 2008 Presidential elections, Republicans had regrouped, tapping into public anxiety over the deepening economic crisis to deride Obama’s stimulus package and the perceived profligacy of ‘big government’. Spearheading this fight-back was the so-called Tea Party; an umbrella title for a multiplicity of grass-roots libertarian groups with various agendas, including a broadly ‘climate sceptic’ constituency, but all sharing the desire to significantly curtail federal government taxation and spending. Inspired by conservative Republican Party critics of the Obama stimulus, this movement grew in popularity throughout 2010 putting pressure on moderate Republican candidates to pursue a fiscally hard line. This approach appeared to play well with public sentiment as the Democrats lost Congressional seats in the election to Tea Party/Republicans, establishing a potentially environmentally hostile and fiscally conservative block on the Presidency's policy-making.  

This influence was felt almost immediately as demands for greater fiscal austerity appeared to shape Obama’s subsequent budget, published in February 2011 (USGPO 2011). It introduced a $3.7 trillion budget designed to cut or reduce some 200 federal programs while introducing new taxes. Yet it stopped short of the deep spending cuts desired by Republicans. While clean energy priorities received a funding boost, as the administration sought to promote greenhouse gas reductions through other fiscal means, other environmental spending took a hit. The proposed budget thus provided over $3 billion for energy efficiency and renewables, representing a 46% increase on 2010 spending. Additional funding was found for promoting solar cell usage, electric vehicles and, more controversially, expanding nuclear power. But no mention was made of climate change per se, although the budget proposal did maintain a Presidential commitment to reducing greenhouse gases. Environmental Protection Agency funding was also reduced reflecting the demands of many hawkish House Republicans. Department of Agriculture funding for wetland conservation also suffered. Overall, the plan appeared pragmatic in trying to meet political priorities for boosting the economy but mindful of counter demands for cuts from Republicans. After a heated Congressional debate, characterised by obstructionism by Republicans, a budget was finally passed which resulted in $38 billion cuts in overall spending (Reuters 2011). 

Senate support for emissions trading legislation also waned in 2011 with no vote taken on it. With his main climate change initiative dead in the water, Obama pledged to pursue climate policy through working with Congress on funding clean energy and pursuing regulatory enforcement via the EPA. In response, ‘climate sceptic’ Republican House members called for cuts to the EPA’s funding and regulatory capacity. They then successfully introduced a House bill to prevent the EPA from addressing climate change by circumventing a 2007 Supreme Court ruling that allows the EPA to control greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act. President Obama stated that he would veto proposals stripping EPA regulatory powers but it appeared nonetheless that his campaign pledge to address the climate issue had become sidelined.

Theoretical analysis
From a partisan perspective government party political alignment would appear to dictate some patterns of green budgeting, endorsing the arguments of Hibbs (1997) and Hicks and Swank (1992). Certainly during the latter part of the Bush administration, a Republican dominated Congress and Presidency seemed relatively uninterested in integrating the environment into federal fiscal cycles. Environmental expenditure therefore marginally fell between 2002 and 2009. An emphasis on the environment in government spending and taxation then rose after the centre-left Obama came to power. Amounts spent, and also raised, during this period appear to correlate with partisanship, particularly reflected in the increased budget of the EPA. Overall we could surmise then that, in line with theoretical predictions, green budgeting does follow partisan preferences, with a centre-left Obama administration and (initially) a Democrat-controlled Congress giving greater preference to this issue than the fiscally restraining Republicans. 

Veto players were also manifestly significant. As Tsebelis and Chang (2004) would argue, ideological ‘alternation’ between the incoming Democrat Obama Presidency and the outgoing Republican Bush is visible. Due to the centrality of the Presidency in federal fiscal cycles, the ideological position of this veto player is critical to determining outcomes. Obama’s preferences for funding environmental initiatives did prove important in shaping policy. There was also evidence of ideological ‘distance’ during the latter part of the administration. Shifts in the political make-up of Congress after the 2010 elections meant an increasing ideological gulf between House Republicans (and the multiple budget committees they controlled) and the President which appeared to result in limited budget structural change away from non-core ‘items’ such as the environment under the shadow of veto. 

Electoral preferences were also potentially influential. Obama was elected on a wave of populist enthusiasm that appeared to provide a strong mandate for his political agenda, including support for environmental issues. Conversely, the widespread Tea Party backlash against high public spending and taxation propelled the Republicans back to a House majority after the 2010 mid-term elections, exerting considerable pressure on federal budgeting generally and environmental issues specifically. 

However, conspicuous problems remain with the theoretical arguments. While partisan politics are clearly important, with Democrats generally privileging more green taxation and expenditure and the Republicans supporting less, more subtle dynamics are evident, i.e. evidence is ‘mixed’ (Bräuninger 2005: 409). Demands to drastically reduce federal expenditures reflected influence from the fiscally conservative Tea Party within the Republican camp. Simple right-left distinctions, as Bawn (1999) argues, may not be applicable. We may also then need to examine party ideology and its exercise through key veto players (Tsebelis and Chang 2004). But here there are problems too. The current ideological gulf between President Obama and the House of Representatives would underline reversion to the ‘status quo’ (i.e. compositional change is lower), but inter-institutional conflict is evident throughout US budgeting history and does not alone explain temporal variations. Finally, public choice remains problematic to determine as US federal politicians are elected on broad policy mandates making it difficult to isolate individual issues. The broader policy debate surrounds responding to the financial situation through fiscal tightening versus stimulus rather than the specific sectoral composition of non-core issues such as the environment. That said, the Republican right has long held suspicions of environmental intervention, particularly on climate change.

The politics of UK green budgeting 
‘The power of the purse’ in the UK has long resided with Her Majesty's Treasury (HMT), headed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer - arguably the second most powerful political figure after the Prime Minister. This is reflected in the HMT’s strangle-hold over the UK budgetary processes. So while the Prime Minister and powerful ministers can intervene in certain budgetary initiatives, HMT's technical expertise and control over allocating resources give it the upper hand over broader budgetary policy. Traditionally budgetary arrangements, including spending and tax policy has formed part of the annual Budget processes. According to Ingham (2000: 174), ‘essentially, the Treasury would fix the total amount of spending for one year and indicate its provisional plans for the following two years.’ Departments would then have to negotiate with the Chancellor and the Chief Secretary of the Treasury (the next ranking Treasury minister) for resources. John Major’s Conservative Government attempted to make the budgetary process more rigorous in 1994 with the Fundamental Expenditure Review (Ingham 2000). 

It was not until the election of Tony Blair’s Labour Government in 1997 that the Treasury gained the apparatus to ensure that public spending could facilitate the government’s long-term aims through (Comprehensive) Spending Reviews. These establish fixed departmental expenditure frameworks and set expenditure linked departmental performance targets. Until recently the UK did not have any organisation body akin to the US OMB. However, in 2010 the Conservative, Liberal Democrat Coalition Government established the Office for Budget Responsibility. Unlike its US counterpart, the Office for Budget Responsibility has little authority over the implementation of public spending. Instead, it produces independent analysis on the UK economy and public finances, for the benefit of the government and parliament.

History of green budgeting – 1940-2009
No recognised green budgeting process existed in the UK until the 1990s. Funds were made available for environmental policies but not well integrated with budgetary processes. The creation of the Department of the Environment in 1970 meant these expenditures became more prominent. Yet the pursuit of monetarism in the 1980s, budgetary policy was more concerned with promoting steady economic growth and low inflation (Ingham 2000: 46), than addressing attendant environmental externalities. Only in the 1990s did the Conservative Government attempt to align these aims in response to the UN-sponsored Brundtland Report's (WECD 1987) call for sustainable development. However, budgetary initiatives prioritised limited eco-taxation rather than promoting environmental improvement through budget composition (HMG 1990).

The newly-elected Labour Government then led formal attempts to integrate environmental issues into budget composition via spending reviews. Labour promised to prioritise the environment across government, with strong Prime Ministerial support (Russel and Jordan 2009). This promise was operationalised informally in the 1998 and 2000 Spending Reviews in which departments were asked to consider the environmental impacts in their spending. In the 2002 and 2004 Spending Reviews a more systematic reporting process was introduced whereby departments had to demonstrate how their spending plans impacted upon the environment through formal appraisal (ibid.). This process, however, was viewed as unsuccessful and subsequently abandoned. Thus prior to the UK’s fiscal stimulus packages to address the financial crisis, some degree of green budgeting had been institutionalised, although efforts were piecemeal. 

The age of austerity?
Labour’s response to the 2008 financial crisis was a £3 billion fiscal stimulus. In its 2008 Pre-Budget Report the Government brought forward capital spending on housing, education, transport and also the environment (HMT 2008). About 17% or under £500 million of the stimulus was allocated to green projects (Box 1). Here, public spending was employed to support economic activity while also promoting the Government's broader environmental goals, especially an 80% cut in greenhouse gas emissions from a baseline of 1990 levels by 2050, as mandated by the Climate Change Act (HMG 2008). 

Box 2. Green component of the UK's 2008 fiscal stimulus (HMT 2008)Insulation and improved heating systems for 60,000 low income households under the 'Warm Front Initiative' (£100 million new funding; £50 million brought forward)Building of 16,000 energy efficient social hosing (£60 million)Expanding rail capacity through new carriages (£300 million)Flood defences (£20million)Improving the British Waterways network structure (£5 million) 

The influential Parliamentary Environmental Audit Committee criticized the stimulus for being too small to radically green the economy (EAC 2009), especially when compared to spending on non-environmental measures. For instance, the green element of the UK's social housing project (Box 2) is dwarfed by the social housing budget of £775 million. Moreover, apart from £100 million for home insulation through the Warm Front Initiave, the stimulus offered little new money for green projects (EAC 2009; para 14). Indeed, as with most measures put forward in the package, much of the green portion merely brought forward pre-existing spending commitments. In reality new spending on green measures only represented 7% of allocations (Smith 2009). When giving evidence to the Environmental Audit Committee, Andrew Simms from the Green New Deal Group, commented that “where the Treasury is concerned, there seems to be almost a cultural adversity towards the mere idea of an environmental agenda” (EAC 2009: Q64; see also Russel and Jordan 2009).

May 2009 delivered an inconclusive general election result where the Conservative party held no overall majority. Following intense negotiations the Conservative party formed a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats. Significantly all of the main parties fought election campaigns with strong environmental commitments, especially tackling climate change. The key economic differences between the parties were over the timing and depth of public spending cuts required to reduce the UK’s blooming public debt. The centre-right Conservatives wanted quick and deep cuts, while the centre-left Labour party and the UK's third party the Liberal Democrats argued for fewer and longer term cuts to public spending to support the fragile economy. As part of their negotiations to form a government, the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats drew up a Coalition Agreement (HMG 2010). The Agreement set out a deficit reduction plan endorsing Conservative preferences for immediate and deep cuts. In terms of the environment, the Agreement emphasised ‘climate change as one of the gravest threats we face’ requiring action for emissions reductions, decarbonisation and green job creation (HMG 2010: 16). Crucially, the Agreement promised that the Coalition Government would be the ‘greenest government ever’ (ibid.), a point later reiterated by the Prime Minister.

But how has this pledge been reflected in resultant budgetary processes? The Coalition Government initially delivered an emergency Budget in June 2010, whereby the Chancellor announced public spending cuts of up to 30% to stabilise public finances by 2014-2015. Although, HMT estimated that the UK needed to spend £200 billion by 2020 to achieve a low-carbon, secure energy network (HMT 2010a), the Government failed to commit to the costs of this transition preferring to reform energy markets and leverage private sector funding. In October 2010, the Government published its Comprehensive Spending Review, announcing a deficit reduction​[1]​ package of £81 billion in public spending by 2014-15 (HMT 2010b). The Environment Department witnessed a budget cut of 29% over this period, one of the biggest amongst UK departments. By contrast, while suffering central budget cuts, the Department of Energy and Climate Change saw its capital expenditure increased by 28% to promote low carbon technologies. 

Thus despite the cuts, climate change funding seemed to be sustained. These included inter alia, £1 billion for developing carbon capture and storage plant, a new carbon tax for businesses raising £1 billion for the public purse by 20-14-15, £200m investment in low-carbon technologies and a subsidy for green domestic heating initiatives. It was also announced that the former Labour Administration's Warm Front Initiative (see Box 2) to improve the efficiency of the poorest households, was to be replaced with the Green Deal. The Green Deal allows power companies to help households pay for domestic energy efficiency measures and recuperate their investment through energy bills of participating customers. In other words, Labour’s redistributive policy aimed at poorer households was replaced with the market-oriented Green Deal aimed at domestic power suppliers and their customers. Following the 2011 Energy Act, the Green Deal is now being rolled out by the Coalition Government. Another interesting development is the establishment of the world’s first ‘green’ investment bank, dedicated exclusively to greening the UK economy. Due to come online in 2013, it will be capitalised with £3 billion to invest in projects aimed at bringing both financial and environmental rewards, such as low carbon technology.

However, cuts in the Environment Department’s budget suggest weaker political preferences for other (non-climate) environmental policies. Indeed, many advisory and regulatory bodies linked to the Environment Department had their budgets removed or cut, including the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution - which conducted expert reports on environmental issues - and the Sustainable Development Commission - which acted as both a watchdog and advisor to government. Other cuts included reducing funding to farmers for environmental protection. These developments led the Environmental Audit Committee to conclude that the Coalition Government is far from the ‘greenest government ever’ (EAC 2011). 

Theoretical analysis
How well then does the theoretical framework explain events? First, unlike the US case, party political alignment appears insignificant. A centre right Conservative Government initially began linking environmental objectives to the budgetary processes through environmental taxes. This process continued under the centre-left Labour Party after 1997. The Labour Government's fiscal stimulus package had a distinct green element with a focus on a low carbon economy, as did the Conservative-led Coalition Government, despite its budget cuts. In contradiction to theoretical predictions, the evidence generally suggests that green budgeting has not been strongly partisan; which is probably a reflection of the support for a green and low carbon agenda (at least on paper) amongst all three UK parties. However, in line with Bräuninger (2005: 410) we see divergence in actor preferences on the ‘level’ and ‘distribution’ of expenditure. For instance, the Labour Party’s redistributive home insulation Warm Front Initiative was replaced by the Coalition’s more market-orientated approaches for domestic energy customers, such as the Green Deal.

Secondly, the UK case does conform to aspects of the veto players thesis. Ideological ‘distance’ between the HMT and the broader environmental goals of government seems accurate. Even with reportedly strong Prime Ministerial support for environmental programmes, the agenda-setting and hierarchical control of budgets by the less environment concerned HMT may well have diluted efforts to green the fiscal stimulus packages. HMT thus potentially represents an institutional veto though in a more informal sense than implied by the theory which stipulates constitutional provision. The UK case of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government provides a good case to test partisan veto player arguments. Rather than ideological ‘distance’ between the Coalition partners (Tsebelis and Chang 2004), both parties had strong manifesto commitments on climate-related environmental protection thus providing a mandate for cooperation.  Thus the parties were able to pursue certain climate related environmental objects in a context of austerity and cuts. As coalition Government outcomes are rare in British politics, it is not possible to fully assess outcomes when there is greater ideological distance. 

Thirdly, drawing conclusions on electoral preferences is more elusive. All three main parties have signalled their strong environmental credentials, particularly on climate change, suggesting that environmental policy is not as marginal a voter preference as frequently argued (for example, Downs 1972). Significantly all three parties supported the 2008 Climate Change Act which committed the UK to an 80% cut in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 (from a base line of 1990 levels). Decarbonisation has therefore become prominent in budgetary responses to the financial crisis. But is this party support reflected in public opinion? Despite concerns about unemployment, public finances and the economy, the electorate seems concerned about climate change. In a Guardian/ICM survey taken during the international Copenhagen Climate Summit, 45% agreed that ‘world leaders are trying to tackle an important problem but they must not lose sight of the need to maintain human prosperity’, and 30% agreed that ‘world leaders are trying to tackle the most serious threat facing mankind’ (The Guardian 2009). 





To re-iterate Hicks and Swank (1992), macro-level politics ‘does matter’ when explaining green budgeting; but exactly what factors are determining green budgeting in the age of austerity and how can we theoretically explain events? Different dynamics pertain in both political contexts, although some trends are discernible from theoretical analysis. Firstly, in both the USA and UK, a partisanship explanation does offer insight. When viewed historically, green budgeting preferences do not always follow predictable left-right patterns, and more reflect incrementalism as described by Wildavsky. However, a different pattern emerges with green fiscal stimulus packages, especially in the USA. A clear ideological divide exists between a generally pro-environment Democratic President who strongly supports fiscal stimulus and the environment sceptic Republican Party. In the UK, the pattern is more nuanced with parties agreeing on funding measures for decarbonisation. However, there are subtle differences in policy selection. For example, the Labour government preference for redistributive approaches, and the Coalition preferring schemes aimed at the individual and the market. Any distinction is not clear-cut as the Labour Government was supportive of market-based approaches such as feed-in tariffs. Secondly, veto players are important, especially in the US federal system of ‘checks and balances’. The relationship between Congress and the Presidency and the degree of ideological distance between them has defined the political propensity for consideration of green budgeting under the Obama administration. As our analysis shows, Republican gains in the Congressional election hampered Obama’s green fiscal measures. In the UK, the agenda setting power of HMT has limited the scope of green budgeting, even when there is strong Prime Ministerial support. The Treasury seemingly represents an informal (i.e. non-constitutional) institutional veto player. Finally, electoral preferences remain problematic as explanatory variables in our cases. It is difficult to separate public environmental concerns in the USA from other electoral determinants such as big government versus small government. Broad cross-party support for the environment means the theory cannot easily be applied in the UK. 

Within the context of this paper, it is difficult to provide a detailed account of why the patterns of influence differed between the two contexts. But the differing institutional structures of government played their part. The US ‘checks and balances’ system establishes a formal institutional veto point for Congress to control the spending of the Presidency. Thus the potential for conflict between the Presidency and Congress is high.  Not only is there a high change of veto with such a configuration, but it arguably promotes more adversarial forms of partisanship as both parties use the powers of the Presidency and Congress to achieve their political means, thereby increasing their ideological distance. By contrast, in the UK no constitutional form of institutional veto exists as the party (or Coalition) in power solely controls expenditure. Budget formulation equates less with partisanship and more with the Treasury’s power in the departmental hierarchy. Moreover, the general cross-party support on environmental issues means that any partisanship will more likely be based on the means by which environmental standards are achieved through budgeting processes.  

Overall, green budgeting is consequently more subtle than our framework would infer. Green concerns in the UK have arguably assumed the mantle of a ‘valence’ issue amongst parties, rather neutralising cross party political disputes. Issues related to the Treasury's 'power of the purse' and meso-level spending review negotiations are therefore important in shaping green budgeting measures. While all the theories provide a better account of green budgeting in the USA through notions of political game-playing and expediency, clearly other factors pertain especially concerning negotiations between the Presidency and Congress over budget settlements. Institutional politics is important as well as the party political. Since most compositional budgeting theory focuses on the latter, it generally fails to engage in how institutions (rules), individuals within institutions (as organisations) or institutional organisations themselves shape the capacity, desire for and outcomes of green budgeting. 

We also observed that positive spending outcomes do not necessarily equate to improved environmental policy or enhanced environmental outcomes. The underlying premise behind the political framing of the Green New Deal and green budgeting in general is that spending promotes economic growth that is environmentally beneficial, or even that environmental spending can produce beneficial economic growth. Indeed, integrating environmental and economic agendas through processes such as green budgeting generally follow a strategy of ecological modernisation (Hertin and Berkhout 2003). However, some analysts remain cautious of this discourse, seeing it as a business as usual approach promoting an underlying technocentric agenda (Bina and La Camera 2011; Luke 2009). Under this line of reasoning, green budgeting is unlikely to enhance long term environmental outcomes as economic growth and environmental protection are incompatible. 
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^1	 	UK's public sector net borrowing stood at £143.2 billion in the financial year 2010/11.
